Hypothetical Brief: Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

ARGUMENT:

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING BYRD’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS QUESTIONABLE EVIDENCE OBTAINED FROM A WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF BYRD’S UNABANDONED TRASH IN VIOLATION OF BYRD’S FOURTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO A REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY IN HIS TRASH.

The Court of Appeals should reverse the District Court’s denial of Byrd’s Motion to Suppress questionable evidence that FBI Agent Patton obtained illegally from Byrd’s trash while trespassing on Byrd’s property. The District Court erred in holding that the FBI’s search of Byrd’s trash was reasonable and not in violation of Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights. The Fourth Amendment states that the “right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated…” U.S. Const. amend. IV.  Regardless of curtilage determination, Fourth Amendment rights to privacy extend to both the homeowner and the homeowner’s property stored in areas intimately associated with the home. Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1, 6-7 (2013); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986).  

The homeowner must demonstrate that he intends to preserve his Fourth Amendment privacy rights regarding such property. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). Furthermore, other individuals must recognize the homeowner’s subjective expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable. Id. An individual does not have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in property left “in an area accessible to the public.” California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 41-43. “Accessible to the public” means that an individual has placed his possessions “in an area particularly suited for public inspection…for the express purpose of having strangers take it.” Id. at 40-41. However, the government must prove that the property is accessible to the public before it allows property to be admitted as evidence. Id. at 40-43; United States v. Deaner, 1 F.3d 192, 196 (3d Cir. 1993).

Unreasonable searches and seizures violate an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights. Id.; Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 177 (1984). Therefore, “all evidence obtained by an unconstitutional search and seizure” in violation of an individual’s Fourth Amendment rights is “inadmissible in a federal court regardless of its source” and cannot be used against the victim. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 653 (1961). The potentially negative public policy consequences of unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures could be far-reaching and could diminish the power of Fourth Amendment protections. U.S. Const. amend. IV. United States, 414 U.S. 338, 347.

Byrd had an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Byrd did not abandon his trash and did not surrender his Fourth Amendment rights to unreasonable searches and seizures of his trash. California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 36 (1988). Any reasonable person would have considered Byrd’s trash to be off-limits. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361. Agent Patton trespassed upon Byrd’s property, violated Byrd’s privacy, stole Byrd’s unabandoned trash, and submitted the contents of the trash as illegal evidence even though Byrd had reasonably taken considerable steps to ensure that the trash was inaccessible for public access. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 177; Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361. The public policy implications of Agent Patton’s unlawful behavior toward Byrd are of great concern. Should the Court uphold Agent Patton’s behavior, then anyone could be at dire risk of losing his/her Fourth Amendment rights through arbitrary and capricious searches and seizures. Since Byrd’s trash was seized in violation of Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights, this Court must reverse the District Court’s denial of Byrd’s Motion to Suppress evidence.

A. The unreasonable, illegal search of Byrd’s trash violated Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The unreasonable, illegal search of Byrd’s trash violated Byrd’s reasonable expectation of privacy. An individual maintains Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable expectation of privacy that extends to an individual’s property and possessions stored in areas intimately associated with the home. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Florida, 569 U.S. 1, 6-7; California, 476 U.S. 207, 213. In order to maintain a reasonable expectation of privacy, an individual: (1) must take reasonable steps to maintain the privacy of his trash, and (2) ensure that others acknowledge the individual’s subjective expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361.

Byrd had a reasonable expectation of privacy in his trash. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Byrd’s right to privacy extended to the trash stored in the trash shed on his property. Florida, 569 U.S. 1, 6-7; California, 476 U.S. 207, 213. Byrd intentionally made considerable efforts to preserve the privacy of his trash. [R. 2-3]. First, Byrd placed his trash in opaque bags. [R. 3]. Byrd then placed the opaque trash bags in a trash bin. [R. 3]. Byrd placed the bin containing the trash in a shed located in the back yard. [R. 3]. Byrd closed the front double doors and the lid of the shed containing the trash bin. [R. 3]. Byrd placed the shed containing the trash in the back yard. [R. 3]. Finally, Byrd enclosed the back yard with a lockable fence. [R. 3]. As such, Byrd satisfied the first prong of the Katz test by ensuring the privacy of his trash. Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361. Even though Byrd invited guests into the backyard for recreational activities and allowed the neighbors’ children to routinely play on the grassy strip on Byrd’s property, Byrd’s neighbors were aware that Byrd’s home and property were private and off-limits unless Byrd was at home to receive them. [R. 2] This satisfied the second prong of the Katz test. Id.

In summary, Agent Patton’s unreasonable, illegal search of Byrd’s trash violated Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable expectation of privacy that extended to the trash stored in his back yard despite Byrd’s efforts to preserve his privacy in a manner that was acknowledged by others. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Florida, 569 U.S. 1, 6-7; California, 476 U.S. 207, 213; Katz, 389 U.S. 347, 361. Thus, this court must reverse the District Court’s denial of Byrd’s Motion to Suppress Evidence.

B. Despite the District Court’s claims that Byrd’s trash was visible and accessible to the public, Byrd did not abandon his trash and did not forfeit his Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable searches and seizures.

Byrd was subjected to an unreasonable search of his unabandoned trash in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. U.S. Const. amend. IV. An individual maintains a Fourth Amendment right to a reasonable expectation of privacy unless he forfeits that right by abandoning his property. U.S. Const. amend. IV; Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 177. Abandonment includes intentionally leaving property in an area accessible to the public in a manner such that the property is available for anyone to take. California, 486 U.S. 35, 41-43.

Byrd did not abandon his trash by leaving it out by the curb in a manner such that the trash was available for collection or accessible to the public. Id., [R. 3]. Byrd’s trash was stored in the back yard in a shed behind an enclosed gate. Katz, 389 U.S. at 347, 359; United States v. Reicherter, 647 F.2d 397 (3d Cir. 1981) (holding that one with a reasonable privacy interest would not discard trash in an area outside of his reasonable expectation of privacy). Byrd protected the back yard from public visibility by placing the trash shed within the fence and behind tall bushes, and he did not knowingly or deliberately expose his trash to the public. United States v. McKenzie, 283 F. App’x 13 (3d Cir. 2008) (holding that a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection). As such, Byrd did not forfeit his Fourth Amendment protections by abandoning his trash. Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 177. In the District Court case, the government argued that Byrd abandoned his trash and had relinquished his Fourth Amendment rights to protection from unreasonable searches and seizures. Abel v. United States, 431 U.S. 956 (1977), United States v. Fulani, 368 F.3d 351, 354 (3d Cir. 2004). Byrd did not abandon his trash on the curb. [M. 2], United States, 647 F.2d, at 397, 399. The trash was located within an enclosure and situated one foot into Byrd’s property and had not been put out for collection. [M. 2]. United States, 647 F.2d, at 397, 399. There was no risk of the trash being picked up by sanitation workers, as Byrd’s trash was not near a road or sidewalk. Id. Since Byrd did not forfeit his Fourth Amendment protections by abandoning his possessions, the District Court erred in denying Byrd’s Motion to Suppress alleged evidence obtained from the search of Byrd’s trash.

C. Agent Patton illegally seized inadmissible alleged evidence from Byrd in violation of Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights.

The District Court erred in denying Byrd’s Motion to Suppress alleged evidence that Agent Patton obtained from the unreasonable, illegal search of Byrd’s trash in violation of Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974). “When the government does engage in physical intrusion of a constitutionally protected area in order to obtain information, that intrusion may constitute a violation of the Fourth Amendment.” United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 284 (1983). Property seized evidence without a warrant cannot be used against the victim and is inadmissible as evidence in court. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006); United States, 414 U.S. 338, 347. Search warrants ensure that invasions of privacy via searches and seizures are not unreasonable. U.S. Const. amend. IV. Otherwise, unless probable cause exists, a warrantless search is unreasonable and unconstitutional. Camara v. Municipal Court of City and County of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967) (citing that “probable cause” to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied).

FBI Agent Patton exercised extraordinary efforts to access Byrd’s trash. Agent Patton trespassed without a warrant on Byrd’s property, entered Byrd’s backyard by opening the gate, lifted the hinged top of the trash shed, removed the trash, took the trash back to his office, and examined its contents [R. 4]. Even though Agent Patton accessed the trash, it was not publicly accessible. United States, 647 F.2d, at 397. Thus, FBI Agent Patton violated Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights by physically intruding upon Byrd’s property to access Byrd’s trash. United States, 460 U.S. 276, 284. Furthermore, Byrd does not have adequate proof that Byrd made his trash accessible to the public. California, 486 U.S. 35, 40-43.

Therefore, the District Court erred in denying Byrd’s Motion to Suppress alleged evidence in violation of Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights.

D. Public policy suggests that allowing law enforcement to conduct unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures would endanger fourth amendment rights of privacy through arbitrary application of warrantless searches and seizures.

Public policy arguments against unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures implicate endangerment of due process rights for others. Byrd’s illegal warrantless search and seizure represents a dangerous precedent that could have longstanding policy implications for any and all individuals residing in the United States of America who would be in jeopardy of losing Fourth Amendment rights to privacy. Camara, 387 U.S. 523, 538. Law enforcement may arrive any time, unannounced, and search the premises of any household without probable cause. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Mapp, 367 U.S. 643, 653. “Without probable cause and a warrant, an officer is limited in what he can do. He cannot arrest a suspect; he cannot conduct a broad search.” State v. Setterstrom, 183 P.3d 1075, 1077 (Wash. 2008). Agent Patton’s blatant violation of Byrd’s rights may threaten the Fourth Amendment rights of individuals similarly situated to Byrd in America. Allowing law enforcement to conduct unreasonable warrantless searches and seizures would endanger the constitutional due process rights of others – particularly the poor, disenfranchised, minority, mentally disabled, or other vulnerable groups – through arbitrary application of warrantless searches and seizures in violation of their privacy. U.S. Const. amend. IV, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. The Court must not support law enforcement behavior similar to that of Agent Patton’s behavior. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should reverse the District Court’s denial of Byrd’s motion to suppress evidence obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure of his trash in violation of his Fourth Amendment protection rights.

Conclusion

The District Court erred in denying Byrd’s Motion to Suppress questionable evidence obtained from a warrantless search of Byrd’s unabandoned trash in violation of Byrd’s Fourth Amendment rights to a reasonable expectation of privacy. U.S. Const. amend. IV.; California, 486 U.S. 35, 36. Furthermore, Byrd did not abandon his trash and did not surrender his Fourth Amendment rights to unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. Const. amend. IV.; Oliver, 466 U.S. 170, 177. Moreover, public policy arguments suggest that unreasonable warrantless arbitrary searches and seizures jeopardize due process rights. U.S. Const. amend. IV, U.S. Const. amend. XIV. Therefore, the Court of Appeals should reverse the District Court’s denial of Byrd’s Motion to Suppress evidence obtained from the unreasonable search and seizure of his trash in violation of his Fourth Amendment protection rights.